Abstract-This paper is concerned with an energy consumption scheduling problem for consumers in smart grid, based on a real time pricing strategy. Firstly, the energy consumption scheduling problem is cast into a noncooperative energy consumption game, where consumers compete with each other in order to minimize their electricity usage cost. Secondly, we prove that the non-cooperative energy consumption game has a unique Nash equilibrium point, i.e., optimal energy consumption solution. Thirdly, the energy consumption solution is obtained by a discrete iterative algorithm.
INTRODUCTION
Matching supply with demand has been a hot topic in operating electricity networks. Traditionally, we have to provide enough generation capacity to meet the peak load, requiring substantial infrastructure that is idle for all but a few hours a year. Smart grid applications are being developed to deal with steadily increasing future demand. Energy consumption scheduling can induce consumers to shift their loads away from peak times [1] [2] [3] . Recently, various pricing schemes have been discussed for implementing energy scheduling in smart grid, such as Time of Use (TOU), Critical Peak Pricing (CPP), Extreme Day CPP (ED-CPP), Extreme Day Pricing (EDP) and Real Time Pricing (RTP) [4] . Recently, with the development of smart metering technologies, which will enable reliable, real-time, two-way information exchange between consumers and electricity energy providers, RTP can be provided to consumers multiple times daily, hourly, or in even shorter intervals. Many economists are convinced that RTP programs are the most direct and efficient scheduling programs suitable for competitive electricity markets [5] . In an RTP program, the energy provider announces electricity prices on a rolling basis, i.e., the price for a given time period (e.g., an hour) is determined and announced before the start of that period (e.g., 15 minutes beforehand).
To handle the two-way information exchange and decision making, consumers will rely on energy management controllers (EMCs), which can modify electricity usage across a home or building based on electricity prices and consumer preferences. From the energy provider's perspective, providing high frequency pricing updates will enable better load shaping and thus result in better matching of supply and demand. For consumers, RTP will provide new opportunities to lower cost by making smart usage decisions.
Rich literature exists on energy scheduling schemes based on RTP, see e.g. [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . In [6] and [7] the main objective is to reduce the total energy cost to consumers without directly addressing the matching of the distributed loads to the available generating capacity. Whereas, in order to match the loads to the supply, [8] proposed a novel RTP algorithm to obtain optimal energy consumption for each consumer by maximizing the social welfare. However, the consumers within a smart grid are selfish, thus they will not cooperate with each other in order to maximize the social welfare. To deal with this problem, [9] gives time-varying prices that can align individual optimality with social welfare maximization. That is to say, social welfare can be implemented by optimizing individual consumers' utilities. In addition, a distributed scheduling mechanism is presented to reduce peak demand within a neighborhood of households [10] , without addressing an optimal scheduling strategy. Since the DR system is a distributed feedback system, a distributed energy consumption control mechanism and pricing are necessary. Then a question arises naturally: how should the consumers choose their energy consumption in a distributed dynamic fashion and how should the energy provider set the electricity price, such that the total energy consumption can match the available supply?
In this paper, we attempt to shed some lights on the above question, and present an energy consumption scheduling scheme based on a non-cooperative game, which is suitable for analyzing distributed strategy design problems in Economics. The main contributions are as follows. We formulate the energy scheduling problem as a non-cooperative game, in which consumers act as players, and then prove the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the energy consumption game. Meanwhile, a distributed, discrete energy consumption control is presented.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model, and formulate the energy scheduling problem as a non-cooperative game. Section III presents the distributed energy consumption scheduling algorithm and numerical results are shown in section IV. Finally, we draw conclusions in section V.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1 , we consider a residential power system consisting of one energy provider and N consumers. The energy provider buys the electricity from the wholesale market and sells it to the consumers. We assume there is an EMC in each household. The role of the EMC is to interact with the energy provider through two-way communication network and schedule the energy usage among the smart appliances, such as Dish washer, Clothes washer, and Air condition.
Here, we assume that the intended operation cycle is divided into K time slots. In each time slot k ( {1 2 } k , ,...,K  ), energy provider receives energy consumption from consumers and sets the electricity price based on the total energy consumption, while consumers decides on their energy consumption by minimizing their electricity usage cost. In this paper, the set of consumers is denoted by {1 2 } , ,...,N

, and the electricity price is
where k i l is the energy consumption of consumer i in time slot
 is a constant parameter determined by energy provider to implement elastic pricing.
k L denotes the generating capacity so that
From (1), we see that the electricity price is increasing with the total energy consumption of consumers. Specifically, the energy provider will set a high price in order to reduce the peak energy consumption, and shift the energy consumption to the valley time by lowering the price. The role of electricity price is similar to the lever principle of economics.
Each consumer tends to minimize its electricity usage cost, consisting of two components. One is the payment for electricity usage; the other is the cost of dissatisfaction for deviating from nominal energy consumption 
, which is decreasing with the energy consumption of consumer i . Thus, the total cost of consumer i in time slot k is denoted by
The minimization of ()
, which is the payoff of consumer i . From (1) and (3), we see that the payoff of each consumer is affected by the electricity price, which is the function of energy consumption of all consumers. That is to say, energy consumption of each consumer can affect the payoff of other consumers. It is noted that we omit the time slot index k for convenience in the following.
Here, each consumer is actually selfish and rational, and tries to maximize its own payoff, but not at the expense of others. In this situation, is the system able to reach an equilibrium wherein no consumer is interested in varying its parameters since each action it takes would lead to a decrease in its own payoff? Game theory provides the means to study these interactions and to solve the problem well.
B. Energy Consumption Game
In this section, we begin by introducing a non-cooperative energy consumption game in which each consumer aims to maximize its own payoff. Then, the competition among consumers can be cast into the following non-cooperative game.
Definition 1 A non-cooperative energy consumption game G is defined as a triple: : { ( ) ( ( )) }
 is the set of active consumers participating in the game,
is the set of possible strategies (energy consumption level) that consumer i can take, and
is the payoff (utility) function.
Note that, Before proceeding further, we need to analyze the Nash equilibrium 1 of the non-cooperative energy consumption game G [11] , which is based on the concept of a best response correspondence as follows. l . We see that the Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies where no layer has an incentive to change his action strategy unilaterally given the strategies of the other players. In the following, we first analyze the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium points in the non-cooperative energy consumption game. To prove the existence of Nash equilibrium, we first give the following lemma obtained from [12] . 
Since demand cannot exceed supply as expressed in (2), the second order derivative of () G has a Nash equilibrium point, but its uniqueness needs to be addressed. Next we will prove the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in non-cooperative energy consumption game G .
1 Given than our space is constrained by the inequality depicted in Eq. (2), we will be concerned with an inner Nash Equilibrium point. 
According to
Solving (9), we have 
Next we employ a standard function similar to the definition in [13] . 
which is equivalent to (12). 
From (11), we see
It is easy to see that
Combining (15) and (16), the monotonicity is proved. ( 1) 4 ( ) 4 ( )
The first order derivative of () when the number of consumers is very large, which indicates that the provider should set the electricity price larger than the willingness parameter of each consumer.
III. ENERGY CONSUMPTION SCHEDULING
In this section, we consider the dynamic energy consumption control algorithm, aiming to reach the unique Nash equilibrium. According to [14] , we have the discrete-time iterative algorithm denoted by
Theorem 3 Suppose the energy consumption game G has a unique inner Nash equilibrium point  l , the gradient iteration of (21) converges to the unique Nash equilibrium, if the following condition is satisfied. 
)
where () i h  is defined in (8) . By (21) and (23) 
where the first inequality is due to the fact that 
where : max From Fig. 2 , we find that the total energy consumption is a little smaller than the generating capacity. To characterize the mismatch of the generating capacity and the total energy consumption, we calculate the supply surplus defined as follows Then, we show the supply surplus versus  in Fig. 4 . It can be seen that the supply surplus is decreasing with the value of  . That is to say, we can match the total energy consumption with the generating capacity by increasing  , while minimizing the electricity usage cost.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, energy consumption scheduling based on non-cooperative game is considered, and an iterative energy consumption algorithm is presented. We find that the energy consumption scheduling with real time pricing can match with the supply across the time slots in a day, and the proposed energy consumption scheduling algorithm is stabilized at the Nash equilibrium. 
